A Race to the Middle in Energy Policy by Parker-Flynn, James E.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 2
A Race to the Middle in Energy Policy
James E. Parker-Flynn
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Parker-Flynn, James E. "A Race to the Middle in Energy Policy." Sustainable Development Law & Policy 15, no. 1 (2015): 4-14, 52-55.
4 SuStainable Development law & policy
a racE to thE MiddLE in EnErgy PoLicy
by James E. Parker-Flynn*
INTRODUCTION
Climate change is the gravest threat currently facing 
humanity.1 To avoid catastrophic climate change over the com-
ing century, global emissions of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) 
must peak in the very near future and decline steeply thereaf-
ter.2 A significant barrier to reducing GHG emissions domesti-
cally is the conflict between and within state energy policies.3 
Some states encourage renewable energies through Renewable 
Portfolio Standards (“RPSs”) and carbon emissions trading 
schemes, while others promote the production and utilization of 
fossil fuels; most, however, promote both to some degree.4
Internally, states are 
motivated to utilize avail-
able energy resources — 
both renewable and fos-
sil fuel — for in-state 
generation of energy, but 
are simultaneously moti-
vated to develop those 
resources for exporta-
tion.5 Texas, for exam-
ple, produces the most 
natural gas and crude oil 
of any state, but also has 
adopted an aggressive 
RPS and leads the nation 
in wind energy genera-
tion.6 Texas’ use of wind 
energy in state reduces 
GHG emissions, but Texas oil and natural gas — whether 
burned in state or exported — increase GHG emissions. Thus, 
some states will partake in a “race to the top” in climate policy 
by reducing net GHG emissions through state energy poli-
cies, others will “race to the bottom” by increasing net GHG 
emissions, while still others will “race to the middle” through 
state policies that effectively maintain current GHG emissions 
levels. Whether a state races to the top, bottom, or middle 
is primarily determined by the energy resources available in 
any given state, the economic costs and benefits of develop-
ing, using, and exporting those resources, along with ancillary 
environmental and social concerns.
This Article posits that the various “races” will have the 
practical effect of leaving the nation as a whole, and the states 
individually, squarely in “the middle.” States’ prevailing desire 
to exploit local resources assures that, absent federal regulations, 
the United States will not contribute to significant reductions 
in global GHG emissions.7 The gains from energy policies 
that encourage renewable energy generation will be offset or 
overwhelmed by competing or concurrent desires to exploit 
fossil fuel resources like natural gas, coal, and oil. Moreover, 
“leakage” and “seepage” of emissions — the former occurs 
when a state imports fossil fuel-derived energy from out of state 
while the latter occurs when a state exports fossil fuels8 — will 
ensure that GHG emissions will not necessarily decrease, even 
where the in-state supply of energy is generated from renewable 
resources; in other words, a state can race against itself. As a 
result, the United States will not contribute significant reductions 
in greenhouse gases, climate change will at best be moderately 
slowed, and the nation will suffer the consequences.
In order to avoid this 
race to the middle, I pro-
pose that the nation adopt 
a unified energy policy 
that not only mandates 
increased consumption of 
renewable energy through 
a national RPS, but that 
also restricts the extrac-
tion and exportation 
of fossil fuels through 
Resource Production 
Limits (“RPLs”) to 
ensure net reductions in 
greenhouse gas emis-
sions. A federal policy 
that focuses on all areas 
of energy production and 
consumption will prevent 
a “bottom” state from undermining the contributions of a “top” 
state, and simultaneously prevent internal state conflicts that 
lead to stagnant net emissions.
A New RACe-TO ANAlysIs
Race-to theory presents an analytical framework in which 
to examine climate change, but a complete analysis must avoid 
the segmentation that has plagued previous analyses. It is clear 
that the United States must reduce GHG emissions to help 
combat climate change. If current domestic energy policies fail 
to significantly reduce GHG emissions, then the nation must 
implement more effective solutions. Existing race-to analyses 
of energy approaches to the climate problem generally focus on 
whether RPSs represent a race-to-the-top.9 These analyses, in 
*Associate at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt. The views and opinions expressed in 
this article are those of the author and do not represent the views and opinions of 
Carlton Fields Jorden Burt or its clients.
“The gains from energy 
policies that encourage 
renewable energy generation 
will be offset or overwhelmed 
by competing or concurrent 
desires to exploit fossil fuel 
resources like natural gas, 
coal, and oil.”
5Winter 2015
following traditional race-to formulas, fail to account for certain 
factors that could lead to the middle—stagnant national emis-
sions in spite of reduced emissions locally. Because the middle 
represents a danger to the United States that is only slightly less 
worrisome than the bottom, it is imperative to know whether 
state energy policies are actually racing to the top, bottom, or 
somewhere in between.
Most commentators have examined the competing races — 
those to the top and bottom — from a regulatory framework; 
they have examined whether state governments, in the absence 
of federal regulation, will craft environmental regulations that 
will either increase or decrease social welfare.10 Public welfare 
is generally measured through an analysis of costs and ben-
efits that quantifies the ecological, economic, and public health 
implications of environmental regulations,11 though at times the 
measure is the mere decrease or increase in environmental regu-
lations.12 Further, commentators examine how individual states 
race with others to attract business, and how those races affect 
the populaces of those states.13
This Article diverges 
from traditional race-to 
analyses in two critical 
respects. First, it explores 
how states’ decisions 
in promoting and 
using available energy 
resources will affect net 
GHG emissions from a 
results-oriented perspec-
tive. A race to the bottom 
thus leads to increased 
GHG emissions, while 
a race to the top leads to 
decreased GHG emis-
sions. The middle repre-
sents stagnant emissions. 
Public welfare — and associated analyses of costs and ben-
efits — is not specifically addressed because it is assumed that 
increased or stagnant emissions will be detrimental to the long-
term health and economic stability of the country.14 Likewise, 
the Article only considers climate change effects, and does not 
consider other environmental consequences of state policies that 
lead to greater or lesser emissions.
Second, this Article examines how the climate impacts of 
energy decisions — made across the country and in relation 
to vastly different energy resources — cumulatively manifest 
at the national level.15 Typically, race-to analyses examine the 
impact of regulations, or the lack thereof, within the partici-
pating states.16 Environmental impacts are thus constrained by 
both the source of the pollution and the proximate geographic 
area. For instance, an analysis might look at the effect of air 
pollution from coal burning power plants on nearby popula-
tions, and how relaxed regulations might attract new coal 
plants but increase the amount of dangerous pollution. Such 
an analysis is essentially the same wherever the power plant 
happens to be; decreased regulations might mean more pollu-
tion and health consequences, but increased job opportunities. 
But all of the effects of the regulations are constrained to the 
populations of the regulating states and proximate areas, and 
possibly the populations of states that lost out on the new coal 
plant because of more stringent regulations.
Contrastingly, the national approach proposed herein is 
more consistent with the premise of the Article because the 
harms of increased greenhouse gases in the atmosphere manifest 
both globally and locally,17 but cannot be constrained to a single 
geographic area. Indeed, climate change disparately impacts dif-
ferent geographic areas,18 but regional effects are not determined 
or altered by the energy source or the method of energy genera-
tion and extraction. For example, all GHG emissions from coal-
burning power plants contribute to climate change, yet people 
near a coal-burning power plant in Pennsylvania will experience 
a different set of climate consequences than people near a coal 
burning power plant in South Texas.19 Thus, decreasing GHG 
emissions from coal plants in Pennsylvania will have different 
climate consequences on 
the local population than 
if the same reductions 
are made in South Texas. 
Further, because GHG 
emissions are “well-
mixed” in the atmosphere, 
increased emissions from 
a Pennsylvania coal 
plant will affect distant 
populations in addition 
to local and proximate 
populations. It is thus 
of no moment whether 
the emissions of an indi-
vidual state decrease if 
the national emissions 
do not. Accordingly, the Article examines whether state energy 
policies lead to increased, decreased, or stagnant emissions on 
the national level. In order to properly examine the climate race 
from a national perspective, however, it is critical to understand 
the state energy policies that form the foundation of the national 
energy policy.
sTATe eNeRGy POlICIes
Whether state energy policies represent a race to the top, 
middle, or bottom for climate change depends on the nature of 
those policies. In analyzing state energy policies, many com-
mentators focus only on the decisions that affect the in-state gen-
eration and use of energy resources. A complete energy policy, 
however, encompasses in-state generation as well as in-state 
production of energy resources — which include all resources 
used to generate electricity as well as fuels — regardless of 
whether those resources are used in-state. Accordingly, this 
Part first examines energy generation, and then the production 
“Indeed, climate change 
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of energy resources, in order to fully analyze the effect of state 
energy policies on GHG emissions.
eNeRGy GeNeRATION 
sTATes wITh RPss
States have increasingly adopted RPSs as part of their energy 
policies in the past twenty years.20 An RPS, in simple terms, 
requires utilities within its jurisdiction to “provide a specified 
amount or percentage of power from renewable sources as part 
of their total offering of electricity.”21 Currently, thirty-seven 
states and the District of Columbia have either a mandatory 
RPS or a statute outlining voluntary renewable energy goals.22 
RPSs ideally will contribute to reductions in GHG emissions by 
mandating or promoting the use of energy sources that emit less 
GHGs than traditional fossil fuel energy sources.23 Indeed some 
commentators argue that RPSs, because they involve voluntary 
and often ambitious state efforts to reduce GHGs despite the 
lack of a federal mandate, represent races to the top.24
Whether RPSs represent a path forward to a more sustain-
able energy future, or simply political greenwashing,25 there is 
an underlying truth about them: RPSs are only segments, and 
often quite small segments, of state energy policies. In other 
words, an RPS explicitly describes only part of the energy policy 
of a state, though it implicitly says much more. For instance, 
Ohio’s RPS requires that all retail electricity providers, except 
for municipal utilities and electric cooperatives, provide at least 
twenty-five percent of retail electricity supply from alternative 
energy sources by 2025.26 The Ohio RPS, therefore, represents 
one-quarter of the state energy policy regarding energy genera-
tion. The remaining three quarters are presumably represented by 
an unwritten policy to generate energy in any way that does not 
violate established laws, even where that generation may lead to 
greater GHG emissions.27 This unwritten policy becomes more 
unnerving when one accounts for potential growth in popula-
tion and energy demand; indeed, seventy-five percent of Ohio’s 
energy supply in 2025 could, theoretically, account for as much 
energy as one hundred percent of Ohio’s energy use today.28 In 
that case, that state’s total emissions would not decrease at all. 
Or, the cost of complying with the RPS could lead Ohio energy 
producers to replace energy currently derived from nuclear 
power or natural gas with energy from coal, increasing GHG 
emissions even as the state gets more energy from renewables.29
Similarly worrisome, the Ohio RPS allows the public energy 
commission to classify any new technology as an advanced 
energy source.30 This allowance is not limited by any emissions 
requirements,31 meaning a new technology to derive energy 
from coal could be considered an advanced energy source, 
even if it increases GHG emissions. Many other RPSs have 
similarly flexible definitions of renewable or alternative energy 
sources that may encourage GHG-intensive energy generation.32 
Additionally, there are concerns about states including existing 
hydroelectric power in their RPSs, which could preclude the 
addition of any new renewable energy.33 Conversely, some state 
RPSs do not include local hydroelectric or geothermal power, 
which forces the state to import less efficient renewable energy 
from out of state to meet the standard.34
Finally, the Ohio RPS — like others — does not account for 
in-state production of energy sources like coal, gas, and oil.35 
Regulations that apply to production of energy sources are found 
elsewhere in the Ohio code.36 These regulations do not set limits 
on the total amount of the energy source that can be extracted 
or produced;37 indeed, every deposit of oil and coal could 
theoretically be exploited under the current Ohio regulations. 
More disturbingly, the word “emission” is not found anywhere 
in any of the regulations regarding oil, gas, and coal produc-
tion.38 Exploitation of energy resources is philosophically and 
practically separated from both energy generation and climate 
change impacts.39 Accordingly, states may have RPSs, but none 
have meaningful RPLs (resource production limits) to prevent 
or substantially limit the extraction and exportation of fossil 
fuel resources. The failure to connect generation and production 
muddies the race-to picture even further.
The Ohio RPS is of course just one example, and is not 
intended to indicate that all RPSs will inherently lead to stagnant 
or rising GHG emissions. Many states are far more aggressive 
with their goals.40 Additionally, many states have enacted other 
climate initiatives that may, alongside RPSs, lead to lower GHG 
emissions.41 But, the Ohio RPS exemplifies the division between 
energy generation and production that undermines existing state 
energy policy measures to address climate change. In short, it 
demonstrates that even those states that have RPSs may end up 
racing somewhere other than the top.
sTATes wIThOUT RPss
While deficiencies in state RPSs may prevent signifi-
cant GHG reduction, more worrisome are states that lack any 
RPS. The states that do not currently have RPSs are Alabama, 
Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, Tennessee, and 
Wyoming.42 Nevertheless, these states may, and often do, utilize 
or promote renewable energy sources. For instance, Florida is 
home to “some of the largest solar power plants nationwide.”43 
Although Florida does not have a RPS, it does “encourage renew-
able electric energy generation” through its Energy Economic 
Zone Pilot Program.44 Additionally, Florida actually restricts the 
amount of natural gas and oil produced from state pools to the 
“reasonable market demand for oil or gas in this state” — one 
of the rare state a RPL.45 In addition to encouraging renewable 
energy, states without RPSs — like those with — may also 
feature energy efficiency standards, building requirements, and 
other demand-side management implements that may indirectly 
decrease GHGs from energy generation.46 Additionally, these 
states may offer tax credits or rebates for clean or renewable 
energy generation.47
While GHG emissions reductions from efficiency standards 
and tax incentives may obtain, energy generators in states with-
out RPSs are not required to generate energy from renewable 
sources. Motivation to utilize renewables thus rests on some 
combination of altruism, economics, reputational incentives, 
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and availability of renewable sources. As noted above, Florida 
encourages renewable production and generates a fair amount 
of solar energy, relatively. Florida does not compare to the 
southwestern states in solar energy potential, but it does have 
areas that offer more solar potential than other eastern states.48 
The state thus has availability and may also have reputational 
incentives to utilize solar power; the state motto is, of course, the 
Sunshine State. Moreover, Florida has over 1,200 miles of coast-
line and is especially vulnerable to one of climate change’s most 
visible impacts, sea level rise.49 Rising sea levels not only pose 
a serious risk to coastal property in the future, they contribute to 
rising insurance rates for residents, and threaten Florida’s drink-
ing water.50 Nevertheless, Florida still generates over 83% of its 
energy from fossil fuel resources, 13.5% from nuclear energy, 
and only .005% from solar energy.51 Florida, which has numerous 
incentives to reduce GHG reduce greenhouse gas emissions — 
available renewable resources, economic and reputational incen-
tives, as possibly the altruistic incentive to protect citizens — 
still produces more carbon dioxide emissions than all but 
four states.52 Without 
an RPS, consequential 
reductions in GHG emis-
sions are unlikely.
Like the states with 
RPSs, states without 
do not set meaningful 
limits on the extraction 
and production of fossil 
fuel resources; Florida’s 
RPL, for instance, is a 
moot instrument, based 
on in-state consumption 
and production. Without 
material limits on either 
the production of fossil fuel or the GHG emissions from gen-
eration, energy generation and production in the fourteen states 
without RPSs are limited only by other regulations. It is likely, 
for instance, that Wyoming will continue to mine and burn coal 
at exceptional rates53 unless other environmental regulations 
are established to control air pollution that indirectly or directly 
decrease GHG emissions.54 It is unlikely, however, that any inde-
pendent regulations will slow the extraction of coal. State energy 
policies that do not feature RPSs are similarly motivated to use 
available resources, the cost and benefits that result from the 
exploitation of those resources, and the cost to import outside 
energy or electricity if necessary. Unlike the states with RPSs, 
however, those without have no mandate to lower emissions 
from in-state generation. Consequently, whether these fourteen 
states race to the top or bottom will depend on which resources 
they can exploit or import.
exPlOITATION Of eNeRGy ResOURCes
As noted above, state energy policies explicitly or implicitly 
encourage the exploitation of local energy resources.55 Because 
states lack RPLs and at best set standards on what energy 
sources are used for generation, exploitation of those resources 
inherently occurs. Accordingly, this section takes a cursory 
examination of the various energy resources that states exploit, 
for both generation and exportation, and the climate impacts of 
those resources.
fOssIl fUels AND NATURAl GAs
Production of natural gas has exploded in recent years due 
to increased recovery of gas from shale deposits.56 Proponents 
of natural gas have touted it as a cleaner source of energy than 
other fossil fuels (coal and oil primarily); accordingly, advo-
cates argue that it should serve as a “bridge” to a lower carbon 
society.57 The heart of the argument is that natural gas produces 
significantly lower GHG emissions than other fossil fuels when 
burned — in addition to its other environmental advantages over 
other fossil fuels58 — and thus the United States should use 
natural gas to replace coal in electricity production and gasoline 
in certain segments of the transportation industry.59 By doing so, 
the U.S. could use natural gas as a bridge fuel to a future where 
the U.S. relies entirely 
on “efficiency, renewable 
sources, and low-carbon 
fossil fuels.”60
While the idea of 
natural gas as a bridge 
fuel is appealing, there 
is considerable debate in 
the academic literature 
about the quantity of 
GHG emissions reduc-
tions, if any, natural gas 
provides over other fossil 
fuels.61 There seems to 
be no debate that natural 
gas produces fewer GHGs than other fossil fuels at the electric-
ity generation stage;62 it is possible, however, that “upstream” 
GHG contributions — such as methane leakage at the extraction 
and transmission stages — offset any gains achieved.63 Whether 
natural gas produces half as many GHGs as other fossil fuels, 
or whether it produces the same or more, the fact remains that 
natural gas is a fossil fuel and will emit some level of GHGs 
when produced and used.64 Further, natural gas produces fewer 
emissions of sulfur dioxide and aerosols than coal, which — in a 
cruel twist — could reduce the benefits of relying on natural gas 
to combat climate change.65
Because natural gas produces GHG emissions that are sig-
nificantly higher than those produced by renewable resources 
like solar and wind, some commentators are concerned that 
increased reliance on natural gas may leave the U.S. stuck on the 
proverbial bridge.66 A full discussion of the reasons why natural 
gas may not be an ideal bridge to a low carbon future is beyond 
the scope of this Article. Two basic premises behind the “bridge 
to nowhere” argument are worth examining briefly, however. 
First, cheap natural gas will not only replace coal and oil, it 
may also prevent development of renewable energy.67 This fear 
“Motivation to utilize 
renewables thus rests on some 
combination of altruism, 
economics, reputational 
incentives, and availability  
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was explored in a study conducted by the International Energy 
Agency in 2011, which assumed that natural gas use would 
account for up to twenty-five percent of world energy supply 
in 2035, but that it would not significantly lower global carbon 
dioxide emissions.68 In such a scenario, a long-term and dan-
gerous warming of 3.5ºC (6.3ºF) would still be likely.69 Second, 
new infrastructure is needed to fully exploit natural gas, and “a 
new generation of gas-fired power stations would have a lifetime 
of at least 25 years, effectively ‘locking in’ billion of tonnes of 
carbon emissions a year.”70 If the United States invests heavily 
in natural gas infrastructure now, new renewable infrastructure is 
effectively priced out by the sunken cost.
Whether natural gas represents a bridge to nowhere, a bridge 
to a sustainable energy future, or something in the middle, there 
is no doubt that natural gas production in the United States has 
increased over the past 20 years.71 Large domestic natural gas 
deposits are distributed throughout the county, and estimates of 
natural gas deposits seemingly increase every year, largely from 
the massive gas resources in the Marcellus Shale deposits that 
span across Pennsylvania, New York, West Virginia, and Ohio.72 
The increased production 
is largely the result of two 
technologies — hydraulic 
fracturing and horizontal 
drilling — that allow pro-
ducers to exploit deposits 
of gas that are locked in 
shale and other tight-rock 
formations.73 Producers 
can now extract gas more 
cheaply, and the market 
price has accordingly 
dropped. As long as there 
are no restrictions on the 
extraction of natural gas 
based on the eventual emissions that will result, the enormous 
economic incentives ensure that extraction and consumption of 
gas will continue to increase globally.74
coaL75
Although perhaps not expanding as rapidly as gas, coal 
production and consumption have increased nationally over the 
past thirty years.76 In the years since 2007 and 2008, however, 
domestic production and consumption have decreased slightly.77 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(“EIA”), the United States has over four billion short tons of 
demonstrated coal reserves,78 and over seventeen billion short 
tons of recoverable coal.79 Global demand for coal, however, is 
rising, particularly in Asia.80 Indeed, China and India, among 
others, are adding new coal burning facilities at an alarming 
rate.81 Accordingly, emissions from coal are rising as well.82 The 
United States has more recoverable deposits of coal than any 
other nation, including China,83 and exports are rising.
Domestically, sizable coal deposits are found in many 
states, including Wyoming, West Virginia, Illinois, Kentucky, 
and North Dakota.84 Many coal-producing states offer incentives 
or tax exemptions for the production or consumption of coal.85 
The EIA predicts the price of domestic coal will rise incremen-
tally over the coming years — primarily as a result of increased 
production costs associated with more costly mines — which 
will result in the retirement of many coal-fired power plants and 
subsequent replacement by cheaper natural gas plants.86 Despite 
the reduction in plants and increase in cost, however, domestic 
coal consumption and production is expected to increase in the 
United States by 2040.87 States with large coal deposits will still 
have the economic incentive to exploit those deposits.88
Coal is the most carbon intensive of the fossil fuel energy 
sources.89 While the debate over the lifecycle GHG emissions 
from natural gas have cast some doubt on the traditional idea 
that coal is the dirtiest fossil fuel,90 there seems to be no debate 
that coal produces more GHG emissions at the generation phase 
than from any other fossil fuel.91 The emissions from burning 
coal can be mitigated through carbon capture and storage tech-
niques, which produces “clean” coal.92 Clean coal has its own 
set of risks, however, one of which is that the captured and stored 
carbon dioxide will find 
its way back into the 
atmosphere.93 Even if the 
captured carbon dioxide 
stays underground, clean 
coal still produces carbon 
dioxide emissions and 
the process of cleaning 
the coal requires energy, 
which leads to more 
emissions.94 Finally, the 
cost to remove and store 
substantial amounts of 
carbon dioxide from coal 
emissions is very high,95 
which suggests energy companies will settle for “cleaner” coal, 
rather than “clean” coal. Without state RPLs to slow coal pro-
duction, coal will still be economically viable for decades and 
states with large coal deposits will likely continue to exploit 
local coal resources.
oiL
The United States is a considerable producer of petroleum, 
and domestic production is increasing.96 Forecasts show that 
the United States will overtake Saudi Arabia as the world’s 
largest producer of oil by 2015.97 Like natural gas, much of the 
increased production in oil comes from shale deposits and the 
increased use of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling.98 
The increased production of domestic oil has been paced in 
recent years by an increase in exports of U.S. oil.99
The largest producers of domestic oil are Texas, North 
Dakota, Alaska, and California.100 Texas currently leads the 
other states by a sizable margin, and production in Texas and 
North Dakota have increased substantially since 2006.101 While 
the increase in Texas’s production was larger, the North Dakota 
“If the United States invests 
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increase is perhaps more alarming — the state’s production of 
oil more than tripled over that period.102 The majority of North 
Dakota’s increase comes from the Bakken formation.103 In just 
a few short years, North Dakota has transformed itself from the 
seventh leading state-producer of domestic oil to the third, and 
now trails only Texas and California.104
Petroleum produces substantial greenhouse gases when 
burned.105 The transportation sector is responsible for twenty-
seven percent of domestic GHG emissions, and over ninety 
percent of those emissions are from petroleum products like 
gasoline and diesel.106 Additional GHGs, in the form of carbon 
dioxide and methane, are released during both the extraction of 
petroleum and the refining process.107 The use of oil products is, 
in short, an extreme net contributor to climate change.
Fossil fuels are incredibly abundant in the United States. 
The nation has large supplies of natural gas, coal, and petroleum, 
and production of all three is poised to rise in the years ahead. 
Technologies like hydraulic fracturing have opened up vast new 
reserves of both natural gas and oil. Increased international reli-
ance on coal also ensures 
a steady demand for 
domestic coal. Because 
of the vast resources 
and seemingly endless 
demands, states are 
poised to exploit their fos-
sil fuel resources for both 
in-state use and export in 
the years ahead. Fossil 
fuels are not the only 
energy sources available 
to states, however, and in 
the coming years renew-
able energy will also play 
an important role in state 
energy policies.
rEnEwaBLE EnErgy rEsourcEs
States are increasingly utilizing domestic renewable sources 
in addition to exploiting fossil fuel resources. This section will 
briefly describe the primary renewable energy resources avail-
able to states.
soLar PowEr
Although fossil fuels and wind would not exist without 
energy from the sun,108 solar power traditionally refers to energy 
directly produced from the sun through photovoltaic (“PV”) 
panels or by concentrating the sun’s power to produce thermal 
energy (concentrated solar power, or “CSP”).109 The United 
States has immense solar power potential, particularly in the 
Southwest.110 Solar power may be harvested at the macro level in 
large solar plants like the Ivanpah solar thermal plant111 and the 
Desert Sunlight PV plant,112 both located in California’s Mojave 
Desert. Additionally, communities and individual homeowners 
may harvest solar power at the micro level.113 Despite massive 
solar power potential, however, solar power only accounts for 
a small percentage of total domestic energy, though the actual 
total is difficult to quantify.114
While the majority of domestic solar power potential is in 
the southwestern United States, solar power resources are ubiqui-
tous; indeed, the states that currently provide the most incentives 
to exploit solar power include many non-southwestern states.115 
Oregon, for instance, is hardly a bastion of sunshine, yet the 
state introduced its first solar tax credit over thirty years ago and 
is still a leader in production of electricity from solar genera-
tion sources.116 Moreover, states like Georgia and Missouri are 
positioned to greatly benefit from solar energy for a number of 
reasons beyond pure solar insolation potential, including cost of 
electricity and cost of installation.117 Solar power is currently 
limited, however, by intermittency issues.
Although intermittency places a limit on solar power gen-
eration, the cost of solar photovoltaic installation, which has 
dropped significantly in recent years,118 is now less of a restraint 
on the expansion of solar power than it was previously. The drop 
stems from reductions in the cost of both the solar modules and 
non-module components 
of installation.119 As 
noted above, however, 
installation costs vary 
significantly by state.120 
In a few years, solar 
energy may actually be 
as cheap as, or cheaper 
than, energy from fossil 
fuels.121 Solar also pro-
vides a fantastic energy 
resource for states that 
prioritize dramatically 
reduced GHG emissions; 
both CSP and PV solar 
produce signif icantly 
fewer life cycle GHG 
emissions than fossil fuels.122 Despite the falling costs and emis-
sions reduction potential, the EIA projects that solar power will 
continue to supply only a small portion of total domestic energy 
in the coming decades.123 States thus have considerable solar 
resources and incentives to exploit those resources, but it is not 
clear that solar will significantly reduce reliance on fossil fuels.
wind PowEr
While solar power is an underutilized yet increasingly 
exploited energy resource, wind power is the current king of 
non-hydro renewable energy resources.124 The United States has 
immense wind potential, particularly in the central portion of the 
country — from Texas up to Canada — and off certain coasts.125 
Installation of utility grade wind power has been increasing 
steadily in recent years.126 The EIA, however, expects wind to 
grow at a slightly slower pace than solar photovoltaic over the 
next three decades.127
Texas is the state that produces the most energy from wind, 
followed by California, Iowa, Illinois, Oregon, Oklahoma, 
“The transportation sector is 
responsible for twenty-seven 
percent of domestic GHG 
emissions, and over ninety 
percent of those emissions  
are from petroleum products 
like gasoline and diesel.”
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and Washington.128 Much of the wind industry boon has been 
fueled by a federal tax credit that is poised to expire at the end 
of 2012.129 Wind power development may slow considerably 
because of the expiration of the tax credit and the glut of cheap 
natural gas.130 Despite cost concerns, wind is an abundant natu-
ral resource available to many states, and wind energy produces 
dramatically less GHG emissions than fossil fuel energy.131 
Like with solar power, economic and environmental incentives, 
as well as intermittency issues, accompany wind power, but it 
is unlikely that the incentives are substantial enough to propel 
wind power ahead of fossil fuel power in state energy policies.
othEr rEnEwaBLE EnErgy sourcEs
There are numerous other renewable energy sources avail-
able to states. Most prominently is hydroelectric power, which 
accounts for fifty-two percent of all renewable energy produced 
in the United States.132 Hydroelectric power generation has 
remained fairly steady in 
the nation over the past 
two decades.133 While 
almost all states utilize 
hydroelectric power to 
some extent, the Pacific 
coast states are the clear 
leaders in hydroelectric 
energy generation.134 
Hydroelectric power pro-
duces few GHG emis-
sions,135 and is a cheap 
source of power.136 
Unfortunately, many of 
the best hydroelectric 
resources have already 
been  developed, 137 
though there is still 
potential for future 
exploitation from exist-
ing but non-powered 
dams.138 While hydroelectric power is renewable and does not 
suffer from the intermittency issues of solar and wind, it is 
dependent on rainfall. Climate change and attendant changes 
in precipitation could thus alter the amount of hydropower 
available to many states.
In addition to hydropower, there is energy potential, both 
realized and untapped, in biomass and biofuels, geothermal 
sources, and waves and tides.139 Biomass and biofuels can be 
generated from a number of sources, including wood, waste, and 
corn.140 It is difficult to quantify the exact GHG reduction poten-
tial of bioenergy because it can be produced from so many dif-
ferent sources, each with attendant land-use consequences and 
GHG potential.141 The IPCC concludes that most bioenergy has 
some GHG mitigation potential, but notes that the sustainability 
of bioenergy rests heavily on land-use practices.142
Geothermal energy — yet another renewable resource — 
represents approximately three percent of all renewable energy 
currently produced in the United States.143 California produces 
the most geothermal energy,144 though there is significant geo-
thermal potential in many of the western states.145 Although 
geothermal energy produces very few GHG emissions,146 
energy growth in this sector has been slower than either wind 
or solar because of siting, cost, and transmission concerns, 
among other issues.147
Finally, wave and tidal power are still in nascent stages.148 
Because of costs and practical difficulties, these two ocean power 
sources are not expected to meaningfully contribute to domestic 
power for many years.149
While ocean power is still a negligible source of energy, 
the United States is blessed with many other abundant renew-
able energy resources, and the nation has substantial fossil 
fuel resources. State energy policies encourage the exploita-
tion of available resources, particularly when those sources 
are cheap. Some states explicitly mandate or encourage the 
use of renewable energy 
for in-state generation 
through the use of RPSs, 
al though renewable 
energy plays some role 
even in states that do not 
made its use. Implicitly, 
however, states segre-
gate energy generation 
from the extraction and 
production of energy 
resources. Because of 
this philosophical and 
practical divide between 
generation and produc-
tion, no states — includ-
ing those with aggressive 
RPSs — have meaning-
ful RPLs. The failure 
of state energy policies 
to address production 
negates efforts to significantly reduce GHG emissions through 
RPSs, and assures that at best, the United States is racing to the 
middle in climate change abatement.
A RACe TO The MIDDle 
CONflICT AND CAUsATION:  
PRODUCTION AND GeNeRATION
The United States has enormous and varied energy 
resources, and competing incentives to produce and use those 
resources. The crux of the issue is whether those resources 
and incentives, embedded in state energy policies, will lead 
to decreased GHG emissions (the “top”), increased GHG 
emissions (the “bottom”), or somewhere in between (the 
“middle”). Here, I argue that state energy policies will lead 
the U.S. to either the middle or the bottom, and consequently, 
the U.S. should adopt a federal energy policy that prioritizes 
both renewable energy generation and simultaneously limits 
“The crux of the issue is 
whether those resources  
and incentives, embedded  
in state energy policies,  
will lead to decreased  
GHG emissions (the “top”), 
increased GHG emissions  
(the “bottom”), or somewhere 
in between (the “middle”).” 
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the production of fossil fuel resources to facilitate a dramatic 
decrease in GHG emissions. In other words, the United States 
should implement a stringent national RPS and RPL.150
The primary reason that state energy policies will lead the 
United States to the middle is conflict: conflict between states, 
and conflict within states. As to the former, for instance, one 
state will vigorously promote renewable energy while another 
will cling to and even expand fossil fuel for in-state genera-
tion; the two states effectively cancel the other out. The latter 
conflict is more concerning and complex, and is exemplified by 
schizophrenic state energy policies that simultaneously seek to 
promote renewable energy generation and fossil fuel production. 
Failure to address the production of fossil fuel resources in state 
policies ensures that the country races to the middle in battle 
against climate change.
CONflICT BeTweeN sTATes
At the core of both conflicts are available energy resources, 
the cost and feasibility of utilizing those energy resources, and 
the potential economic benefits of extracting those resources, 
whether used in state or elsewhere. Greatly simplified, states with 
abundant fossil fuel resources will maximize those resources as 
long as economic incentives exist, while states with abundant 
renewable energy resources will maximize those resources. If 
a state has insufficient internal resources to power the state, it 
will either import energy resources for in-state generation, or 
directly import electricity from other states.151 Incentives to 
exploit renewable energy are more complex, as some states may 
desire to produce or use renewable energy for perceived moral, 
environmental, or reputational benefits.
Despite complex alternative incentives to exploit renewable 
resources, available resources and economic considerations are 
still the primary drivers behind state energy policies, and can 
lead a state to adopt policies that are either beneficial or detri-
mental in the climate context. Oregon, for instance, is generally 
considered an environmentally conscious state; it has a relatively 
ambitious RPS152 and zealously promotes solar energy despite 
a relative dearth of solar resources.153 It has thus adopted an 
energy policy that is racing to the top in the climate context. 
But this policy is still dependent on available resources and 
economics; in-state generation of electricity comes primarily 
from hydroelectric power, of which Oregon has substantial and 
affordable in-state resources.154 The state also has significant 
wind resources, but transmission and economic considerations 
have prevented wind from consistently providing a large portion 
of Oregon’s electricity.155 Nevertheless, decreasing costs and 
availability drive the state to further develop wind resources. 
Only a small portion of Oregon’s energy consumption derives 
from non-biomass, non-hydro renewable resources.156 Finally, 
Oregon generates almost thirty percent of its electricity from 
either natural gas or coal,157 though it has no domestic fossil fuel 
resources.158 The state thus produces over eighty-five percent of 
its electricity from hydroelectric and fossil fuels — which are 
cheap and available, and cheap to import, respectively — while 
wind, which is available and cheaper than before, becomes a 
bigger part of the state profile. Regardless of the motivations, 
however, Oregon’s remains a sterling example of a state energy 
policy that heavily promotes renewable energy.
In contrast to Oregon, Wyoming has considerable fossil 
fuel resources,159 but no RPS.160 Almost ninety-three percent 
of Wyoming electricity generation is from coal and natural gas, 
with coal accounting for the overwhelming majority.161 When 
factoring in transportation, almost ninety-five percent of all 
energy consumed in Wyoming derives from fossil fuels.162 In 
addition to fossil fuel resources, Wyoming has abundant wind 
resources.163 Although Wyoming has not yet maximized its wind 
resources, it appears that the state is beginning to exploit its vast 
wind potential.164 Because the state has no RPS, however, there 
is no mandate for renewable energy generation. As such, the 
state will only fully maximize local wind resources if economi-
cally feasible, or if other factors, like environmental concerns, 
overwhelm the desire to use cheap, local coal. Regardless, it 
appears that Wyoming coal production will continue unabated 
in the immediate future,165 and that the state’s coal exports will 
continue to increase.166
Oregon and Wyoming represent two sides of the energy 
coin. One has abundant renewable energy resources coupled 
with strong internal economic and environmental incentives to 
promote renewable energy, while the other has abundant fossil 
fuel resources and formidable economic incentives to exploit 
those resources. The two state energy policies philosophically 
negate each other167 and ensure that while one state races to the 
top with decreased GHG emissions from in-state generation of 
electricity, the other races to the bottom through production of 
substantial amounts of GHG-producing fossil fuels for both in-
state use and for export elsewhere.
CONflICT wIThIN sTATes AND The PROBleMs Of 
leAkAGe AND seePAGe
In addition to conflict between state energy policies, there is 
conflict within individual state energy policies that results from 
the philosophical and practical disconnect between energy gen-
eration and production. As noted previously, states may or may 
not have RPSs, but none currently have meaningful RPLs. This 
conflict between generation and production can cause a state to 
race against itself; for instance, a state with a strong RPS may 
offset the resultant GHG reductions through increased exports 
of fossil fuels.
The segmentation of production and generation is revealed 
by “leakage” and “seepage,” two concepts for which race 
analyses must account. “Leakage” occurs when strict in-state 
environmental regulations drive energy generation out-of-state, 
where regulations are not as strict.168 Instead of building new 
renewable power plants, a state may instead import some elec-
tricity from existing plants out of state.169 As a result, a state may 
achieve its RPS goals without fundamentally altering the amount 
of greenhouse gas emissions generated by its populace.170
Even where the in-state generation policies promote the 
use of renewable energies or alternative fossil fuels like natu-
ral gas, conflicting drivers may also lead to the more insidious 
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form of leakage, which I call “seepage.” Seepage occurs when 
increased in-state utilization of renewable and alternative energy 
sources leads to greater exports of traditional fossil fuels, and 
subsequently, stagnant or increased GHG emissions. While state 
energy policies may promote the domestic use of alternative and 
renewable energies, there are currently no states that have imple-
mented meaningful RPLs that prevent the production and sale 
of, for instance, coal.171 If local (or domestic) demand decreases 
due to RPSs or other state measures, supply and demand eco-
nomics suggest that coal producers — if coal is still cheap to 
produce and profitable to sell — will simply attempt to sell their 
goods elsewhere; there are still many places, both domestically 
and internationally, that burn coal, and indeed, coal exports from 
the U.S. are increasing.172 This internal conflict to profit from 
the export of fossil fuels is evident even in states that do not pro-
duce fossil fuels. Oregon, for instance, produces no coal and is 
phasing out existing coal power plants, but the state nevertheless 
assists in the export of Wyoming coal through Oregon ports.173 
Indeed, Oregon is consid-
ering more projects that 
would allow it to export 
even more coal.174
Thus, powerful eco-
nomic incentives assure 
that fossil fuel supply 
and its consequent GHG 
emissions will seep or 
leak abroad and, conse-
quently, net GHG emis-
sions will not decline.175 
It is irrelevant whether 
or not the increase in 
exports is a direct result 
of state energy policies 
that limit in-state gen-
eration of electricity from 
fossil fuels, or simply the 
result of greater demand abroad176; state-based energy policies 
that focus only on energy generation cannot lead to decreased 
global emissions if local production of greenhouse gas intensive 
fuels are not simultaneously reduced.
The CAUTIONARy CAse Of TexAs
Perhaps no state better demonstrates the conflict driving 
the United States to the middle than Texas. Texas has more fos-
sil fuel reserves and more renewable energy potential than any 
other state.177 It has a fairly aggressive RPS that calls for at least 
10,000 megawatts of renewable energy electricity generation 
by 2025.178 Texas already produces more electricity from wind 
energy than any other state, and will add considerably more in 
the next decade.179 Conversely, the state also leads the nation 
in both oil and natural gas production.180 In addition to its vast 
internal oil and gas reserves, Texas is also the nation’s largest 
refiner of oil,181 much of which is extracted in other states and 
Canada.182 Additionally, with port access in the Gulf of Mexico, 
Texas is one of the leading exporters of oil products to foreign 
countries.183 Despite the widespread use of wind energy in the 
state, Texas leads the nation in GHG emissions.184
Texas thus demonstrates the conflicting interests rampant in 
state energy policies. It has substantial energy resources, both 
renewable and fossil fuel, and tremendous incentives to exploit 
all of its resources. Because of its location — in the Southwest 
with a Gulf Coast border — Texas is at risk of substantial dam-
ages from climate change. Its coast is threatened by several feet 
of sea level rise,185 its water resources threatened by rising tem-
peratures and faster evaporation rates,186 its citizens threatened 
by extreme heat,187 and its agriculture at risk from drought.188 
The potential devastation that Texas faces from climate change 
provides the state incredible incentive to transition as quickly 
as possible to renewable energies that reduce GHG emissions. 
Conversely, Texas has tremendous economic incentives to 
exploit its fossil fuel resources regardless of how it generates 
energy in state. Petroleum accounts for over twenty percent of 
Texas exports.189 There 
are so many fossil fuel 
reserves in the state that 
energy companies spend 
billions of dollars on roy-
alties; indeed, almost a 
billion dollars in royalties 
annually goes to Texas 
itself.190 Not surprisingly, 
Texas oil and gas produc-
tion, far from decreasing, 
is rising.191
Texas is thus rac-
ing against Texas. Its 
energy policy promotes 
renewable energy use 
while it simultaneously 
encourages the produc-
tion and use of fossil fuel 
resources. The state is adding in-state energy generation from 
renewable sources, but also from fossil fuel resources; subse-
quently, in-state emissions still lead the nation. Texas is also 
exporting ever-greater amounts of fossil fuels, ensuring that 
emissions eliminated domestically seep abroad. Because of its 
schizophrenic energy policy, Texas is at best racing to the middle 
as an individual state, and at worst is offsetting the gains of states 
that race to the top.
States, like Texas, have conflicting incentives to exploit both 
fossil fuels and renewable energy sources. State energy policies 
at best limit emissions from in-state generation, but universally 
ignore the production and export of fossil fuels. An analysis 
that accounts for entire energy policies, including production, 
sheds new light on the effectiveness of state energy policies 
to address climate change. Because of conflicts between and 
among states, including the failure of state energy policies to 
set meaningful RPLs, state energy policies do not represent a 
race to the top in climate policy. Some disparate state energy 
“While state energy policies 
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policies race in opposite directions, and effectively cancel each 
other out, while other state energy policies race internally to a 
stalemate. Consequently, state energy policies represent a race to 
the middle at best.
The ARGUMeNT fOR A feDeRAl POlICy
Because conflicting interests assure that state energy poli-
cies will at best lead the nation to the middle — an unaccept-
able position if the United States is to avoid the substantial, 
adverse impacts of climate change — the underlying solution 
is clear: the United States must implement a unified federal 
energy policy that both promotes the domestic utilization of 
renewable energy and restricts the domestic extraction and 
production of fossil fuels. Only through a strong federal floor 
that includes a stringent RPS and RPL — or alternate system 
of limiting production192 — can the nation assure meaningfully 
reduced net GHG emissions. The federal energy policy should 
proscribe GHG limits from energy generation that steadily and 
signif icantly decrease 
over the next few 
decades. Similarly, the 
policy should proscribe 
a RPL that mandates 
limits on the extraction 
and production of fossil 
fuels. Like the limits on 
generation, allowable 
extraction under the 
national RPL should 
consistently decline 
over the years to ensure 
meaningful reductions in 
GHG emissions.
Through a unif ied 
federal energy policy 
that limits both the 
production of energy 
sources and subsequent generation, the United States can 
achieve material GHG emissions reductions. In so doing, the 
nation will send a powerful message to the rest of the world, 
which in turn may lead to further emissions reductions glob-
ally. Moreover, it will eliminate the inefficiencies and conflicts 
that cause state energy policies to race to the middle in climate 
policy. Consequently, a unified federal energy policy will give 
the United States, and the world, a chance to weaken the blow 
of catastrophic climate change.
CONClUsION
Climate change presents an immense and nearly unimagi-
nable threat to American society. In this century, the effects of 
climate change will grow more pronounced and dire. While it 
is likely too late to prevent all of the negative consequences of 
global warming, the world may still have a chance to avoid cata-
strophic climate change. In order to avert the worst consequences, 
global GHG emissions must dramatically decrease in the near 
future. For a number of reasons, such a dramatic decrease will 
not become a reality unless the United States significantly abates 
its GHG emissions. As yet, the federal government has not taken 
serious steps to address the climate problem; indeed, it has made 
little effort to reduce GHG emissions from energy.
Domestic energy is dominated by state energy policies. 
Some of these states policies have measures to reduce GHG 
emissions, primarily in the form of RPSs. There is an extensive 
body of legal literature that attempts to answer whether RPSs rep-
resent a race to the top in either environmental or climate policy. 
Existing race-to analyses are incomplete, however, because they 
only address RPSs, which focus on in-state energy generation 
and neglect production and exportation. Leakage and seepage of 
emissions assures that GHG emission cannot be reduced through 
RPSs alone. A comprehensive analysis of state energy policies 
must therefore also account for the extraction and production of 
energy resources in order to fully account for GHG emissions.
This Article instead approaches the race-to analysis from 
a different perspective. 
It focuses entirely on 
net GHG emissions. 
Decreased emissions 
indicate a race to the top 
while increased emis-
sions indicate a race to 
the bottom. Additionally, 
the Article examines the 
results from a national 
perspective. Finally, the 
Article accounts for both 
generation and produc-
tion, and thus incorpo-
rates emissions from 
both leakage and seep-
age. From this different 
perspective, the Article 
concludes that the inher-
ent conflict between and within state energy policies will lead to 
emissions that increase or stagnate; state energy policies there-
fore represent, at best, a race to the middle in climate policy.
Accordingly, the United States should adopt a unified federal 
energy policy that limits GHG emissions from domestic energy 
generation and production through a national RPS and RPL. 
By addressing generation and production, the United States can 
meaningfully reduce GHG emissions. In the process, the nation 
will provide both leadership and an emissions-reduction method 
to the rest of the world that hopefully will result in reduced 
global GHG emissions. Most importantly, it will give human-
ity a legitimate opportunity to avoid the worst consequences of 
climate change. 
“The United States must 
implement a unified federal 
energy policy that both 
promotes the domestic 
utilization of renewable energy 
and restricts the domestic 
extraction and production  
of fossil fuels.”
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